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Maritime Stability Operations Marines

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The U. S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual Createspace Independent Publishing Platform

Jennifer Morrison Taw examines the military's sudden embrace of stability operations and their implications for American foreign policy and war.

Maritime Stability Operations (Nwp 3-07) Elsevier

This monograph addresses the topic of Command-Leadership-Management (CLM) success attributes in Stability Operations and is intended to reach a wide audience of actors, including military and civilian deliverers of effect at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operations. It was developed from a dissertation and updated while the author was deployed in Iraq at a time of transition from Combat Operations (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM) to fully declared Stability Operations (Operation NEW DAWN).

Stability Operations (McWp 3-03) Columbia University Press

KNOW HOW THE WORLD'S MOST EFFECTIVE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE REALLY WORKS, FIGHTS AND WINS! FULL-SIZE FORMAT - biggest edition on Amazon: giant 8.5" x 11" size - clear, detailed print, large margins for notes. Current 2017 edition, Complete & Unabridged. "Batteries last hours, books last decades. Get the print edition!" Operations provides a complete insight into how the U.S.

Marines' warfighting philosophy translates into real action, describing how Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) elements are employed in a wide range of global crisis-response missions. Created by the USMC's finest strategic minds, tried and tested by real-world battle, Operations is also an incredibly valuable text for anyone who wishes to learn how to plan, deploy assets, run operations, and achieve success through the exercise of superior organizational ability, expedient decision-making, and the selective application of force. This current edition supersedes the pre-2011 version. OPERATIONS CONTAINS: THE MARINE CORPS IN NATIONAL DEFENSE MARINE CORPS FORCES AND EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS CONDUCTING EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS MILITARY ENGAGEMENT, SECURITY COOPERATION AND DETERRENCE CRISIS RESPONSE AND LIMITED CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS MAJOR OPERATIONS AND CAMPAIGNS COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS OTHER TACTICAL OPERATIONS RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY OPERATIONS STABILITY OPERATIONS SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS APPENDICES GLOSSARY REFERENCES FROM THE FOREWORD: Developed just prior to

the momentous events of 11 September 2001, the original edition reflected the language and operational constructs prevalent within joint doctrine at that time. Key among them were the notions of "war" versus "military operations other than war," as well as the unstated, but imbedded, belief that the ability to defeat a conventional adversary granted the ability to succeed against "lesser" foes. Since then, Marines have successfully conducted a wide variety of expeditionary missions, including the projection of a landing force from amphibious ships in the Indian Ocean more than 400 miles inland into Afghanistan; a mechanized attack from Kuwait to Baghdad, followed by prolonged counterinsurgency operations to pacify major portions of Iraq; and numerous crisis response operations worldwide. The diversity of operations, the expanded application of Marine Corps capabilities, and the changing lexicon all illustrate how our collective American understanding of the security era, our national strategy, our organizations, and our employment of military power have evolved during nearly ten years of conflict. Accordingly, this new edition reflects that evolution. Marine Corps commanders and staffs at all levels should read, study, and be thoroughly conversant with this book. The notion that "words matter," is embedded throughout this publication, which defines key terms to ensure Marines speak a common operational language. Find also on Amazon: The Official US Marine Corps Warfighting Handbook (MCDP 1) (ISBN: 1973705990) The Official US Marine Corps Strategy Handbook (MCDP 1-1) (ISBN: 1973896001) The Official US Marine Corps Campaigning Handbook (MCDP 1-2) (COMING SOON) The Official US Marine Corps Tactics Handbook (MCDP 1-3) (COMING SOON) Search Amazon for

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Defining the Marine Corps Reserve for the Long War Lulu.com

The foundations of military police operations are based on the successful employment of military police Soldiers, past and present. This manual describes the military police support provided to Army forces that are conducting unified land operations within the framework of joint operations and increases the emphasis on simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability tasks and the critical discussion of defense support of civil authorities. Military police (MP) support Marine air-ground task force operations during peace, conflict, and war. As described in the National Defense Strategy and The Long War: Send in the Marines, there is an unparalleled need for police skills worldwide as terrorists, insurgents, and criminal technology advancements increase. Military police identify and help reduce these threats at all levels of conflict across the range of military operations and provide support within assigned areas through performance of their mission and support capabilities.

Army Techniques Publication Atp 3-06 Marine Corps Techniques Publication 12-10b Urban Operations 7 December 2017 Createspace Independent Publishing Platform

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication MCWP 3-03 US Marine Corps Stability Operations 16 December 2016 The Marine Corps will continue, with increasing frequency, to conduct activities in support of stability operations. These operations will span the range of military operations, from peacetime engagement, to limited contingencies and crisis response, to major operations and campaigns. During periods of relative calm, combatant commanders will use Marine Corps operating forces, either Marine air-ground task forces or other task-organized force packages, in support of our national strategy of engagement. This aspect of our national strategy assists in building host nation capacities, promotes democracy and the rule of law, and builds understanding of our cultures. Beyond peacetime engagement, Marine Corps operating forces will participate in both limited contingency and crisis response stability operations.

Identifying the Pillars of Stability Operations CreateSpace

Within the United States, there is an emergent political consensus on the need to improve civilian capacity for diplomacy and development missions, including stabilization and reconstruction. In addition to such needed civilian capacity, the nation will require military civil affairs capabilities to meet defense security cooperation goals, combat requirements under international law, and a U.S. capability for reconstruction and stabilization in contested environments or sectors. Civil affairs forces are designed to provide expertise to military commanders in their interface with civil societies, including in the fields of rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information. The recommendations in this report seek to marry the Defense Department's rhetorical commitment to excellence in civil-military operations—including stability operations, counterinsurgency, and aspects of irregular warfare—with concrete improvements in military capability. Absent such progress, the military may find itself, as it has so many times in the past, ill-equipped for missions outside its conception of "traditional warfare."

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication McWp 3-03 US Marine Corps Stability Operations 16 December 2016 independently Published

The Maritime Engineering Reference Book is a one-stop source for engineers involved in marine engineering and naval architecture. In this essential reference, Anthony F. Molland has brought together the work of a number of the world's leading writers in the field to create an inclusive volume for a wide audience of marine engineers, naval architects and those involved in marine operations, insurance and other related fields. Coverage ranges from the basics to more advanced topics in ship design, construction and operation. All the key areas are covered, including ship flotation and stability, ship structures, propulsion, seakeeping and maneuvering. The marine environment and maritime safety are explored as well as new technologies, such as computer aided ship design and remotely operated vehicles (ROVs). Facts, figures and data from world-

leading experts makes this an invaluable ready-reference for those involved in the field of maritime engineering. Professor A.F. Molland, BSc, MSc, PhD, CEng, FRINA. is Emeritus Professor of Ship Design at the University of Southampton, UK. He has lectured ship design and operation for many years. He has carried out extensive research and published widely on ship design and various aspects of ship hydrodynamics. * A comprehensive overview from best-selling authors including Bryan Barrass, Rawson and Tupper, and David Eyres * Covers basic and advanced material on marine engineering and Naval Architecture topics * Have key facts, figures and data to hand in one complete reference book

Georgetown University Press

The long, hot summer of 2003 drew to a close for the Marine Corps forces remaining in Iraq. The brief offensive of March-April had become an unplanned occupation and peacekeeping campaign. Lieutenant General James T. Conway's I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) staff had announced the transition to "Post-hostility Operations" on 15 April, and the redeployment to a new operating area to the south of Baghdad ensued. The scope of Operation Iraqi Freedom shifted into security and stability operations, facilitating humanitarian assistance and restoring civilian rule. Furthermore, the Marine Corps presence in Iraq loomed more temporary than ever with the identification of follow-on military contingents of the loose Coalition organized by the United States and United Nations that would take over these duties upon their arrival in Iraq.

Stability Operations Strategic Studies Institute

Almost as soon as Saddam Hussein's regime collapsed in 2003, it became apparent to U.S. commanders that a second deployment of Marines to Iraq would be necessary to conduct security and stability operations. This monograph recounts the first two years of this second deployment during which Marines were responsible for Iraq's cast al-Anbar Province. It focuses on I Marine's Expeditionary Force's deployment in 2004 and II Marine Expeditionary Force's deployment in 2005, and focuses on planning, counterinsurgency operations, and efforts to build civil-military relations with the Iraqi population. The first and second battles of Fallujah and the battle of an-Najaf are also highlighted.

Defining Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations Requirements for Future Department of the Navy Training and Analytical Models and Simulations Pickle Partners Publishing

Includes 103 photos, maps and illustrations The following account represents one of the earliest efforts to chronicle Marine Corps operations in Iraq between 2004 and 2005. This was a significant period in the history of Operation Iraqi Freedom, seeing two battles fought over the city of Fallujah, the eruption of the Sadr revolt in an-Najaf, continuous counterinsurgency operations throughout Iraq, and initial efforts on the part of Marines to cultivate and forge alliances with the tribes of Iraq's al-Anbar Province. Almost as soon as Saddam Hussein's regime collapsed in 2003, it became apparent to U.S. commanders that a second deployment of Marines to Iraq would be necessary to conduct security and stability operations. This monograph recounts the first two years of this second deployment during which Marines were responsible for Iraq's vast al-Anbar Province. This study focuses on I Marine Expeditionary Force's deployment in 2004 and II Marine Expeditionary Force's deployment of 2005, paying close attention to planning, counterinsurgency operations, and efforts to build civil-military relations with the Iraqi population. Particular attention is also paid to the first and second battles of Fallujah and the battle of an-Najaf.

Institutionalizing Irregular Warfare Capabilities CSIS

This manual provides guidance for the organization, planning, and conduct of the full range of military operations on urbanized terrain. This publication was prepared primarily for commanders, staffs, and subordinate leaders down to the squad and fire team level. It is written from a Marine air-ground task force perspective, with emphasis on the ground combat element as the most likely supported element in that environment. It provides the level of detailed information that supports the complexities of planning, preparing for, and executing small-unit combat operations on urbanized terrain. It also provides historical and environmental information that supports planning

and training for combat in built-up areas

The Official US Marine Corps Operations Handbook Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
This manual, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication MCWP 3-01 Offensive and Defensive Tactics September 2019, comprehensively addresses the philosophy of tactics in general and offensive and defensive tactics specifically, across the range of military operations. It does not specifically discuss stability doctrine, tactics, or operations; although it does contain guidance for simultaneously recognizing, executing, and transitioning between offense, defense, and stability activities. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication MCWP 3-01 Offensive and Defensive Tactics September 2019 is the Marine Corps' basic warfighting offensive and defensive tactics publication. MCWP 3-01 serves as a common starting point for leaders and units to address the specific tactical problems that face them. It is a compendium of best practices and common terms, not a dictate that must be rigidly adhered to. MCWP 3-01 provides the basics of offensive and defensive tactics from the squad level to the Marine division and points the reader to references for further study. This publication is intended for the Marines, leaders, commanders, and staffs from the squad level to the Marine division as a foundational document to assist in the preparation and execution of offensive and defensive tactics in any given operational environment.

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication MCWP 3-01 Offensive and Defensive Tactics September 2019 Vigeo Press

From the end of the Vietnam War until Operation Enduring Freedom, the United States military did not engage in significant counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. The decline in the U.S. military's experience in this area is evident in the fidelity of the joint doctrine and service manuals such as Joint Publication 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense and U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency Operations, contains some detail for planning COIN operations, but is a reprint of Fleet Marine Field Manual 8-2, and is somewhat dated from its original publishing in 1980. Operation Iraqi Freedom has required the U.S. military to relearn the COIN lessons forgotten from campaigns in Central America, the Philippines, and Vietnam. However, as mentioned above, a corps planner will find little guidance in military literature. This monograph seeks to provide that guidance by providing an analysis framework, the theoretical knowledge, and sources of additional guidance. Drawing primarily from academia, this monograph analyzes insurgencies using the familiar METT-TC format to understand an insurgency's motivations, strategies, tactics, targets, and means. It then uses the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a case study against which the reader may test the theoretical knowledge presented on insurgencies.

Naval Civil Engineering Operations December 2007 Createspace Independent Publishing Platform

This manual is designed to fill a doctrinal gap. It has been 20 years since the Army published a field manual devoted exclusively to counterinsurgency operations. For the Marine Corps it has been 25 years. With our Soldiers and Marines fighting insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is essential that we give them a manual that provides principles and guidelines for counterinsurgency operations. Such guidance must be grounded in historical studies. However, it also must be informed by contemporary experiences. This manual takes a general approach to counterinsurgency operations. The Army and Marine Corps recognize that every insurgency is contextual and presents its own set of challenges. You cannot fight former Saddamists and Islamic extremists the same way you would have fought the Viet Cong, Moros, or Tupamaros; the application of principles and fundamentals to deal with each varies considerably. Nonetheless, all insurgencies, even today's highly adaptable strains, remain wars amongst the people. They use variations of standard themes and adhere to elements of a recognizable revolutionary campaign plan. This manual therefore addresses the common characteristics of insurgencies. It strives to provide those conducting counterinsurgency campaigns with a solid foundation for understanding and addressing specific insurgencies. A counterinsurgency campaign is, as described in this manual, a mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations conducted along multiple lines of operations. It requires Soldiers and Marines to employ a mix of familiar combat tasks and skills more often associated with nonmilitary agencies. The balance between them depends on the local situation. Achieving this balance is not easy. It requires leaders at all levels to adjust their approach constantly. They must ensure that their Soldiers and Marines are ready to be greeted with either a handshake or a hand grenade while taking on missions only infrequently practiced until recently at our combat training centers. Soldiers and Marines are expected to be nation

builders as well as warriors. They must be prepared to help reestablish institutions and local security forces and assist in rebuilding infrastructure and basic services. They must be able to facilitate establishing local governance and the rule of law. The list of such tasks is long; performing them involves extensive coordination and cooperation with many intergovernmental, host-nation, and international agencies. Indeed, the responsibilities of leaders in a counterinsurgency campaign are daunting; however, the discussions in this manual alerts leaders to the challenges of such campaigns and suggest general approaches for grappling with those challenges. Conducting a successful counterinsurgency campaign requires a flexible, adaptive force led by agile, well-informed, culturally astute leaders. It is our hope that this manual provides the guidelines needed to succeed in operations that are exceedingly difficult and complex. Our Soldiers and Marines deserve nothing less.

The Maritime Engineering Reference Book Marine Corps Interim Publication Maritime Stability Operations Mclp 3-33.02 Nwp 3-07 Comdtinst 3120.11

The Department of Defense activated U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in 1987, but the Marine Corps did not become a full partner until 2006. This study explores why. The activation of U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) demonstrates the limitations of a senior civilian to prompt change in a military organization, especially after his perceived indecision encourages additional resistance. Culture matters. The Marine Corps adopted an "acknowledge and evade" strategy to retain control of its Marines, prevent the creation of an "elite within an elite" in its ranks, and undermine Secretary Rumsfeld's eventual desire to create a Marine Corps special operations component. The non-traditional backgrounds of the officers and senior-enlisted personnel who proved pivotal in MARSOC's development exposed them to unique career opportunities that better equipped them to adapt to the demands of the post-9/11 environment. These Marines represented a fundamental disconnect between the culture of the Marine Corps as an institution and how that culture manifested in the actions of its members. They believed in the special operations mission and its importance to the future of the Marine Corps. Motivated by professional duty, they embodied what it means to be a Marine and helped Secretary Rumsfeld overcome an intransigent senior Marine Corps leadership. These quiet professionals are the unsung heroes of the Marine Corps' journey to a special operations component. I. Introduction * II. Military Innovation * A. Bureaucracies and Change * B. External Drivers * C. Internal Drivers * D. Doctrine and Change * III. Military Culture * A. The Elusiveness of Organizational Culture * B. The "Essence" of the Organization * C. Culture Creation and Socialization * D. Organizational Culture and the Marine Corps * IV. Marine Corps Culture * A. A Healthy Dose of Paranoia * B. Cultivating an Elite Image * V. The Corps' Formative Years and the Influence of Archibald Henderson * A. The Importance of Ships Guards * B. Bringing Stability to the Corps * C. Emerging Requirements, Stagnant Mission * D. Revolution in Panama * VI. The Marine Corps and the New Navy * A. The New Navy * B. The Marine Corps Rebuffs the New Navy * C. The Greer Board and Its Aftermath * D. A Small Victory for the New Navy * E. Fullam Stokes the Flames Again * F. The Roosevelt Personnel Board and War With Spain * G. The Advance Base Force and a Lack of Progress * VII. The Marine Corps and Defense Unification * A. Interservice Strife * B. Differing Visions for the Future * C. Defense-In-Depth * VIII. Goldwater-Nichols and Defense Reorganization * A. The Case For and History of Reorganization * B. The Marine Corps Responds * C. The Beirut Bombing and Operation Urgent Fury * D. General Kelley and the Corps Defend The JCS * E. The Bill and Its Aftermath * IX. The Marine Corps and Special Operations * A. Special Operations History * B. Defense Reform and the Marine Corps * C. Maneuver Warfare: People * D. Maneuver Warfare: Ideas * E. Maneuver Warfare: Hardware * F. The MEU(SOC) and the Future * X. The Development of a Component * A. Transforming the DOD * B. The Aftermath of 9/11 * C. Det One * D. Organizing and Activating A Component * E. Cultural Intransigence * F. "Separable But Not Separate" * G. Manpower Strain * H. Marine Corps Perceptions and Post-OEF Planning * I. "Marines Are Who We Are; Special Operations Are What We Do" * J. The Raiders * XI. Conclusion

The New Counterinsurgency Era Createspace Independent Publishing Platform

The manual describes the general strategy for the U.S. Marines but it is beneficial for not only every Marine to read but concepts on leadership can be gathered to lead a business to a family. If you want to see what make Marines so effective this book is a good place to start.

Marine Corps Interim Publication Maritime Stability Operations Mclp 3-33.02 Nwp 3-07 Comdtinst 3120.11 Routledge

Three excellent reports have been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction: Amphibious Operations in the 21st Century, Amphibious Ships and Landing Craft

Data Book, Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Overview. There will continue to be a blurring of what was previously thought to be distinct forms of war or conflict- conventional war, irregular challenges, terrorism, and criminality-into what can be described as hybrid challenges. Hybrid challenges can be posed by states, proxy forces, or armed groups attempting to impose excessive political, human, and materiel costs in order to undermine their adversary's resolve and commitment. Thus, we expect opponents-operating in a highly dispersed manner-to blend different approaches, integrating all forms of weapons and technology to oppose our efforts. All of these challenges combined illustrate the importance of being able to operate in littoral regions, which encompass the confluence of water, air, and land. The littoral is composed of two segments. The seaward portion is that area from the open ocean to the shore that must be controlled to support operations ashore. The landward portion is the area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea. This confluence is infinite in its variations. As a result, littoral operations are inherently challenging. As described in the maritime strategy, our national security is tied to maintaining stability in these littoral areas. Amphibious capabilities will be required to bridge the seams between water, land, and air, not merely for forcible entry purposes, but as the means of further exploiting the sea as maneuver space to conduct persistent littoral operations. Countering dispersed adversaries employing hybrid tactics will require multiple, simultaneous, and distributed actions by amphibious forces throughout the littoral region. With forces continuously maneuvering between and among locations afloat and ashore, the littoral must be viewed as a single domain.

Marine Corps Tactical Publication MCTP 3-03D Security Cooperation August 2020 Lulu.com

The United States faces diverse challenges requiring a broad range of flexible capabilities to meet the ongoing security and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, confront aggressive state and non-state actors, and provide humanitarian assistance. The key objective in force readiness and preparation to operate in diverse environments across the spectrum of conflict is flexibility. This enables the Army and Marine Corps to meet today's global challenges and successfully respond to emerging crises. Operational forces maintain flexibility to succeed in overseas contingency and civil support operations only through rigorous, effective training. Effective training conditions thought processes, reinforces best practices, and improves operational capability. The best training combines personal and corporate knowledge with "hands-on" experience to keep Soldiers and Marines responsive and flexible to fast-changing operational environments. Each must be proficient in individual skills and critical collective functions identified in their unit mission-essential task lists. Today's ongoing complex operations demand adaptive training that realistically incorporates lessons learned and enemy and friendly tactics, techniques, and procedures for counterinsurgency (COIN) and hybrid operations. The dynamic demands of persistent conflict and a high operational tempo are met through effective training, which is essential to our nation's success. This newsletter focuses on Army and Marine Corps predeployment and sustainment training for operations in Afghanistan as service, joint, or coalition forces. The professional journal articles included herein illustrate unit actions taken at home station, combat training centers, and in theater to prepare personnel and units to meet Operation Enduring Freedom's (OEF) challenges. The Soldiers and Marines highlighted clearly demonstrated ingenuity and leadership in their actions to defeat the enemy, enabled the operating forces, and success

Marine Corps Civil Affairs: Just a Name, Not a Capacity Lulu.com

The Marine Corps Reserve is an operational reserve, and the ongoing Global War on Terror has called for the increased reliance on our Reserve Marines. In the next several years, the Marine Corps will shift its focus from current high priority operations and prepare to assume additional security and stability operations as described in the operational employment concept The Long War: Send in the Marines. This operational shift will occur in an era of anticipated budget cuts and it will continue to require Reserve Marines to serve under unique and demanding circumstances. The Commandant of the Marine Corps must establish principles to guide Reserve Component capability development and employment to ensure its value to the Marine Corps as a vital and fully engaged partner in the Long War. This SRP proposes missions and force structure to develop future Marine Corps Reserve capabilities that build on existing strengths and create flexible options to fill gaps in Active Component capabilities as new threats emerge. The Marine Corps' goal should be to field an effectively organized and mission-ready Reserve Component as a valued element of the Nation's expeditionary force-in-readiness.

U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004 - 2005: Into the Fray: U.S. Marines in the Global War on Terror [Illustrated Edition] CreateSpace

When the U.S. military invaded Iraq, it lacked a common understanding of the problems inherent in counterinsurgency campaigns. It had neither studied them, nor developed doctrine and tactics to deal with them. It is fair to say that in 2003, most Army officers knew more about the U.S. Civil War than they did about counterinsurgency. The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual was written to fill that void. The result of unprecedented collaboration among top U.S. military experts, scholars, and practitioners in the field, the manual espouses an approach to combat that emphasizes constant adaptation and learning, the importance of decentralized

decision-making, the need to understand local politics and customs, and the key role of intelligence in winning the support of the population. The manual also emphasizes the paradoxical and often counterintuitive nature of counterinsurgency operations: sometimes the more you protect your forces, the less secure you are; sometimes the more force you use, the less effective it is; sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction. An new introduction by Sarah Sewall, director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, places the manual in critical and historical perspective, explaining the significance and potential impact of

this revolutionary challenge to conventional U.S. military doctrine. An attempt by our military to redefine itself in the aftermath of 9/11 and the new world of international terrorism, The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual will play a vital role in American military campaigns for years to come. The University of Chicago Press will donate a portion of the proceeds from this book to the Fisher House Foundation, a private-public partnership that supports the families of America's injured servicemen. To learn more about the Fisher House Foundation, visit www.fisherhouse.org.